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A Revised Portrait of Human Agency
A Critical Engagement with Hans Joas’s Creative Appropriation of the
Pragmatic Approach
Vincent Colapietro
1 Anthony Giddens,  Hans Joas,  Margaret Archer,  Norbert  Wiley,  and Eugene Halton (to
name but a handful of such figures) are social theorists whose philosophical importance
is all too often missed (or ignored) by professional philosophers. The main reason for this
is  obvious:  they are by training and appointment social  scientists,  while professional
philosophy tends to be an insular discipline.1 Disciplinary purity, like most other forms of
this misplaced ideal, tends to insure insularity and vitiate vitality. The ideal of keeping
philosophy pure from the taint of other disciplines remains, for the most part, in place
(cf. Rorty 1982, chapter 2). A too fastidious sense of disciplinary boundaries is, however,
antithetical to philosophical pragmatism2 and, more generally, theoretical vitality. I am
by no means advocating an ethos of facile trans-disciplinarity, much less “transgression,”
only  a  commitment  to  what  Richard  J. Bernstein  calls  “engaged  pluralism.”3 The
inevitably  overlapping  practices  of  diversely  situated  actors  (including  those
representing institutionally separated disciplines) invite a critical engagement with social
practices other than those in which we are most at home. Regarding action and agency
especially,  professional  philosophers  have  much  to  learn  from  the  human  sciences,
especially from such erudite and sophisticated theorists as Giddens, Joas, Archer, Wiley,
and Halton.
2 On this occasion, I would like to call attention to Hans Joas’s The Creativity of Action (1996).
This  study  is  a  significant  contribution  to  social  theory  in  an  inclusive  sense  (thus,
potentially an extremely noteworthy contribution to social philosophy). It is, moreover,
itself a creative appropriation of some of the most important insights of the pragmatic
tradition. Finally, Joas’s appropriation of pragmatism bears directly on our conception of
our selves.  Though his  focus is  on action,  the implications of  his  investigation for  a
portrait  of  agency  are  hard  to  miss.  Human  beings  are  portrayed  by  the  classical
pragmatists as situated actors and, as such, as creatively responsive beings. The work of
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Joas and others details this portrait beyond anything accomplished by these pragmatists
themselves.
 
I. Creative Action and Human Agency
3 Hence,  the  revised  portrait  of  human  agency  sketched  mostly  in  broad,  bold,  but
arresting strokes by Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead (see Colapietro 1992, also 1988) is, in
the work of  such contemporary theorists  as  Joas,  Archer,  Wiley,  and Halton,  further
revised.  (I  omit  Giddens  because,  unlike  these  theorists,  he  does  not  draw upon the
pragmatists.) This portrait is revised in such a way as to make the pragmatist account of
creative  actors  even  more  relevant  to  contemporary  theorizing  and  (of  far  greater
moment) the actual conditions of our historical world than the sketch originally offered
by Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead. As instructive and illuminating as I find the work of
Archer,  Wiley,  and  Halton,  I  want  on  this  occasion  to  focus  exclusively  on  the
contribution of Joas in developing some central insights of American pragmatism. I want
to  do  so  above  all  because  such  an  engagement  with  this  theorist  seems  especially
appropriate for the inaugural issue of this newly founded journal.
4 In the end, however, my interest is not in this or that theorist. It is not even in this or that
tradition (including the tradition of pragmatism). Rather my interest is in the question of
agency. My consideration of the pragmatic perspective, as creatively appropriated by Joas
in The Creativity of Action and, indeed, in his other writings,4 is prompted by the judgment
that there is something not only truly novel but also theoretically fruitful in what I am
disposed to identify as the revised portrait of human agency. In particular, his focus on
situation, corporeality, and sociality as the most fundamental emphases of a theory of
creative action (or situated creativity) can be taken to provide nothing less than a revised
draft of what itself was a dramatic revision of the traditional depiction of human beings.5
5 In other words,  his theory of creative action is,  by implication, a portrait of creative
actors. Hence, my chosen task on this auspicious occasion is to recall this theory for the
purpose of portraying such actors.
 
II. Joas’s Creative Appropriation of the Pragmatic
Approach to Human Action
6 For the purposes of his inquiry, Joas focuses in the first instance on sociological (rather
than  narrowly  philosophical)  theories  of  action  (1996:  4).  His  reason  for  doing  so,
however, should make this focus attractive to philosophical pragmatists (philosophers
and indeed others who are working out of the rich tradition of American pragmatism). He
states this reason succinctly:
By contrast analytic philosophy, which has taken a fruitful methodological path of
its own, is at a disadvantage compared with sociology, for it has contributed little to
defining the social character of action and the orientation of actors to one another;
the reason here is  that  analytical  philosophy takes  the individual  actions  of  an
individual actor as its starting point. (4)
7 Joas acknowledges that his methodological decision to focus on sociological theories “is
not absolutely compelling,” but he trusts that it “should at least be comprehensible for
those whose thought is shaped by other disciplines” (4). Whatever else human agents are,
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they are not only social beings but also social actors – precisely in their role as agents,
humans do not just happen to be social but sociality is woven into the very fabric of their
agency.  (As  we will  stress  later,  sociality  and corporeality  are,  on Joas’s  account,  as
integral features of human activity as is creativity.) As the title of Talcott Parsons’s book
(a work to which Joas devotes considerable attention) implies, the structure of human
action is the structure of social action.6 Any approach that does not take as its starting
point the social character of human action is doomed from the outset to offer a fatally
flawed account of human agency and, indeed, of much else.
8 This relates directly to pragmatism. “The whole originality of pragmatism, the whole
point in it, is,” William James stressed, “its use of the concrete way of seeing. It begins
with concreteness, and returns and ends with it” (MT, 281-2). It is instructive to recall
here that, in the controversies regarding his pragmatism as an account of truth, James
traced the root of the dispute between pragmatists and anti-pragmatists to the difference
between those who are committed to concrete ways of  approaching phenomena and
those who are ensnared in abstractions without realizing it (i.e., those who habitually
commit what A. N. Whitehead calls “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (cf. James, MT,
301, 325). Already in his Principles of Psychology (1890), James observed: “Life is one long
struggle between conclusions based on abstract ways of conceiving cases, and opposite
conclusions prompted by our instinctive perception of them as individual facts” (1266).
From his perspective,  the debate regarding pragmatism, as a theory of truth, quickly
became  one  intense  struggle  between  just  these  two  propensities.  In  a  tone  of
exasperation, James insists: “[…] when the pragmatist speaks of opinions, does he mean
any such insulated and unmotivated abstractions as are here supposed [by the critics]?”
He however does not allow this to stand simply as a rhetorical question, immediately
adding: “Of course not, he means men’s opinions in the flesh, as they have really formed
themselves,  opinions surrounded by their  grounds and the influences  they obey and
exert, and along with the whole environment of social communication in which they are
a part and out of which they take their rise” (MT, 310-1).
9 What James asserts here regarding opinions might with at least equal force be said of
action or activity, when conceived pragmatically. There is an irony in James’s own failure
to  stress  sufficiently  the  inescapable  environment  of  social  communication in  which
human opinions acquire their function, force, and status (including the status or standing
of some of them as true, i.e., as worthy of our commitment or reliance). But, in reference
to action, none of the pragmatists failed to stress the inescapable environment of social
life.  Human action is,  even in the innermost recesses of  our solitary musements and
reflections, a performance by a social actor whose reliance upon linguistic competencies
and other shared human practices would be too obvious to note were it not for their
habitual neglect by all too many theorists.7
10 For pragmatism, then, the need to make explicit the depth to which sociality penetrates
the espousal of our most personal beliefs, without thereby eliminating the truly decisive
role  of  individual  agents,  is  matched  by  the  need  to  make  explicit  just  this  depth
regarding our  singularly  expressive  actions  (those  deeds  in  which we most  uniquely
express and define our selves).8 Insofar as the dominant theories of action in analytic
philosophy abstract from the social character of human action – also from the situated,
corporeal,  and  creative  dimensions  of  human  activity  –  it  would  be,  on  pragmatist
grounds, methodologically advantageous to turn aside from this tradition of theorizing
and to turn toward those traditions in which this  character is  the matter of  utmost
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concern. This is true even if some of those traditions fall outside of philosophy. So, at
least, is the decision orienting Joas’s project in The Creativity of Action. From a pragmatist
perspective,  moreover,  the cultivation of  the sociological  imagination is  a theoretical
exigency for philosophical  inquirers no less  than social  scientists  or,  more narrowly,
sociological theorists.9
11 But  matters  cut  in  the  opposite  direct  as  well.  What  Parsons  was  unable  to  see  or
unwilling to admit is what Joas himself sees clearly and grants forthrightly.  “Parsons
failed,” Joas stresses, “to recognize that the classical thinkers of sociology [such figures as
Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Ferdinand Tönnies] were not attempting
to erect the new discipline on traditional philosophical foundations, but that sociology
was itself a philosophical project” (1996: 69). This is nowhere more evident than in the
attempts of these figures to articulate an adequate theory of human action. “Notions of
the creativity of human action,” Joas readily acknowledges, played a clearly constitutive
role in the work of these authors” (69). Even so, none of them “succeeded in smoothly
integrating their thoughts on a theory of creativity into the rest of their work” (69).
When we turn to theorists for whom creativity occupies a pivotal role in their accounts of
human activity – when we turn (as Joas does in Chapter 2 – “Metaphors of Creativity”) to
Johann Gottfried Herder on expression, Karl Marx on both production and revolution, or
Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche on the surging force of a creative will – we
encounter  rich  resources  for  understanding  human  creativity.  At  the  same  time,
however, we are confronted with the deep-rooted tendency to mark off creative action as
a  separate  category  (in  effect  perpetuating  the  dualism between the  blindly  routine
exertions of human actors in their everyday circumstances and the genuinely creative
achievements of remarkably unique agents). What distinguishes Joas’s efforts as much as
anything  else  is  his  resolute  refusal  to  posit  a  residual  category  of  creative  action.
Following  the  pragmatists  (especially  Dewey),  he  makes  creative  activity  –  the
improvisational responses of human beings to the concrete situations in which they are
implicated  (cf.  LW  1,  67)  –  the  most  basic  form  of  human  action.  Rationality,
intentionality, and various other matters are to be approached in terms of the situated
creativity  of human beings,  rather than such creativity being approached in terms of
abstract  and,  hence,  ahistoric  conceptions  of  reason,  intention,  and  a  host  of  other
traditional explanatory categories.
 
III. A Pragmatist Alternative to the Two Regnant
Models of Human Action
12 Joas’s intention is to provide “a fundamental restructuring of the principles underlying
mainstream action theory”  (1996:  144).  He is  not  trying to  add a  category or  set  of
categories  to those already in place;  rather he is  striving to restructure at  the most
fundamental  level  our  understanding  of  human  activity.10 He  takes  these  principles
underlying our mainstream understanding to be embodied in each one of the two regnant
models of human action. For his purpose, then, the various differences between the model
of rational action and that of normatively oriented action are far less significant than their
basic agreement regarding three critical points.11 “The true alternative to taking rational
action as our starting point, and thereby creating a residual category, therefore lies […] in
the reconstructive introduction of the concept of rational action” (147).12 In other words,
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what is needed is a category of intelligent, creative activity to replace the regnant model of
rational action and the supplemental models of non-rational action.
13 The “tacit assumptions behind ideas of rational action,” as these have defined the field of
inquiry, are in the first instance what most need to be identified. Above all,  they are
rooted in three presuppositions. All of the theories being subjected to critique by Joas
“presuppose firstly that the actor is capable of purposive action, secondly that he has
control over his own body, and thirdly that he is autonomous vis-à-vis his fellow human
beings  and  environment”  (147).  At  first  blush  (perhaps  even  after  more  extended
consideration), these assumptions are likely to appear, to many inquirers, to be entirely
innocent and, indeed, reasonable. But each one tends to suppress an adequate recognition
of situated creativity as the primordial form of human action. As a consequence, Joas feels
compelled to call into question these seemingly innocent and undeniable truths about the
exercise  of  our  agency.  He  thus  offers  a  non-teleological  interpretation  of  the
intentionality of action (148-67), a highly suggestive account of the constitution of the
body schema (167-84), and finally a more abridged yet even more compelling description
of the primordial sociality of human life and, hence, human agency (184-95).13 While I will
touch upon all three of these contributions to our understanding of action, I will focus
primarily  on  the  first  one  (Joas’s  pragmatist  critique  of  the  traditional  forms  of
teleological explanation). But, even before doing so, other matters require attention.
14 The first  such matter  concerns  the  most  basic  differences  between the  two regnant
models.  While the affinities are,  ultimately,  of importance,  the differences are hardly
negligible. The model of rational action, so dominant in economic theorizing, was the
object of sociological critique. The tendency on the part of sociologists, in their role as
theorists  of  action,  however,  was  to  grant  legitimacy  to  this  model  and  then  to
supplement it by identifying other categories of human exertion or engagement (e.g., in
Weber’s typology of action, instrumentally rational actions [zweckrational] are juxtaposed
to value-rational [wertrational], affectual, and traditional actions, whereas we witness, in
Vilfredo Pareto’s work, a conscientious attempt to recognize “non-economic spheres of
society” (Joas 1996: 38)). The result is, however, to assign “all those forms of action [other
than  rational  or,  in  Pareto’s  language,  “logical”  action]  […]  to  a  negatively defined
residual category (that of non-rational or non-logical actions).
15 As already indicated, for virtually all of the sociologists under consideration by Joas, the
legitimacy  of  the  model  of  rational  action  for  explaining  phenomena  in  the
methodologically  distinct  domain  of  economic  activity went  either  altogether
unchallenged  or  only  superficially  challenged.  Indeed,  the  critique  of  this  highly
influential model tended to leave unchallenged the most basic assumptions of this model.
A sociological theory of action would need to be more encompassing than the conception
(allegedly)  adequate for explaining our economic activities.  But,  both for the narrow
purpose of explaining the behavior of economic actors and the far more comprehensive
one of providing the most basic terms in which to conceive rational agency, the model of
rational  action occupies  the  default  position.  Ironically,  then,  the  sociological  critics
unwittingly  espoused the assumptions  of  the  very model  of  action that  these  critics
imagined they were subjecting to radical criticism.
16 Taking Parsons as a (if not the) paradigm of a sociological theorist who tried to subject the
model of rational action to a thoroughgoing critique, Joas argues: “Although we must
agree with Parsons in distancing ourselves from the model of rational action, it does not
follow that we must agree with his solution, namely the development of a normativist
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conception of action, is really the best way to lay the foundations for an approach that
goes beyond the rational model” (1996: 44). Parsons’ “alternative consists in assuming
that social order is guaranteed by mutually formed values and in maintaining that the
model  of  rational  action  can  be  overcome  [only]  by  considering  those  normative
orientations which are involved in the constitution of goals and the choice of means”
(1996:  14).  Adherents of  the model  of  rational  action must presuppose a normatively
structured  society  in  which  rational  agents  set  goals  for  themselves  and,  moreover,
identify the means most effective for the realization of their aims. But these theorists
have no way of accounting for society in this sense.  That is,  rational action on their
understanding makes  sense only  in  such a  social  world,  but  the only  kind of  action
recognized by them cannot generate or maintain such a world.14 The structure of human
action must be conceived in terms of the structure of social  action and,  in turn,  the
conception  of  social  action  being  advocated  by  Parsons  is  one  in  which  the  norms
constitutive of a given social order are, at the same time, definitive of social action as
such (see, e.g.,  Joas 1996: 14). In other words, “only a normatively oriented theory of
actions” –  a  theory in which the irreducibly normative structure of  the social  order
provides  the  framework  for  understanding  the  irreducibly  normative  orientation  of
human activity – gives Parsons an adequate conceptualization of such activity (cf. Joas
1996: 24).
17 It is, however, far from insignificant that Parsons “completely ignored the philosophical
schools,  be  they  pragmatism  or  the  philosophy  of  life,  which  were  emerging
contemporaneously with classical sociological thought and which doubtless had a major
impact  on the thinkers he discusses” (1996:  44).  In general,  he tended to isolate the
figures upon whom he was drawing and those to whom he was responding (often the very
same figures – e.g., Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Tönnies) “from their philosophical
and  cultural  background”  (Joas  1996:  66).  The  deeply  philosophical  import  of  the
distinctive contributions of  these sociological  theorists  is  thereby erased or,  at  least,
concealed. (Part of the value of Joas’s The Creativity of Action is that he relates in a detailed
manner sociological theorists to their philosophical background.) Even worse, “Parsons
paid a high price for the greater integrity of his normatively oriented theory of action”
(1996: 34). This can be seen if we realize that his efforts at integrating what he took to be
the  deepest  insights  of  his  theoretical  precursors  resulted  in  a  comprehensive
understanding of human action, with one glaring exception. In ignoring the pragmatist as
well  as  Nietzschean contributions to the debates regarding the forms,  functions,  and
efficacy of human action, Parsons all too hastily overlooked “any consideration of the
creative dimension of action” (Joas 1996: 34). This was the price, the extremely high price,
he ended up paying for his neglect of especially the pragmatists.
18 The point is not to make Parsons into a whipping boy. This is certainly not Joas’s objective
in his nuanced and informed treatment of this theorist; nor is it any part of my aim.
Rather the point is to highlight the way in which the neglect of certain pivotal figures in
late modern thought – e.g., Herder, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson on one side of
the Atlantic Ocean, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead on the other side – can be overlooked
only at the risk of missing what is, especially at this historical juncture, most critical for
our self-understanding. One of the deepest ironies regarding American pragmatism is,
despite the largely inexplicable persistence of what is an altogether unjust criticism (how
many times can the representatives of a tradition correct a misinterpretation of their
position and still  go unheeded or unheard?),  the very opposite of the charge is true:
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“Dewey and the other pragmatists were concerned not to interpret all action according to
the model of instrumental action, but, on the contrary, to offer a critique of the overly
narrow ‘practical’  orientation of American life” (Joas 1996: 132; emphasis added). The
world is not reduced by the pragmatists to an amorphous stuff more or less amenable to
the ingenious efforts of human agents to recast it in more humanly satisfying forms;
rather  human  beings  can  discover  and  appropriate  the  world,  from  the  pragmatist
perspective,  only  through their  actions.  That  is,  “the  pragmatists  attempt  to  anchor
creativity in the actions of human beings in their natural and social environment” (1996:
132). This makes of pragmatism never anything less than a “theory of situated creativity”
(133). Such creativity is irrepressibly operative in any situation into which human actors
have been historically thrown, also in any situation into which such agents deliberately
insert themselves.
19 Let  us,  however,  return  more  directly  to  the  rival  accounts  of  human  action  being
evaluated by Joas in The Creativity of Action. The “central thesis” of this magisterial study
is  that  “a third model  of action should be added to the two predominant models  of
action” (i.e., to those of rational action and normatively oriented action) (cf. 1996: 6). This
third model is one “that emphasizes the creative character of human action” (Joas 1996:
4). In Joas’s judgment, this model overarches the other two, by which I take him to me
encompasses the model of rational action and normatively oriented action. This model is, in
other words,  theoretically more comprehensive than the other two;  indeed,  “only by
introducing  a  concept  of  action  which  consistently  takes  account  of  this  creative
dimension [of human activity] can the other models of action be assigned their proper
logical place” (5). The pragmatist model of situated creativity can make sense out of the
range of  phenomena for  which the other dominant  models  have been designed in a
manner in which these models cannot account for creativity.
20 In fact, Joas goes even farther than this: only by making creativity constitutive of our
responses  to  situations  (as  this  implies,  only  by  envisioning  actions  as  responses  to
situations whose meaning is inherent in these situation themselves), he contends, “can
the  wealth  of  concepts  involved  in  the  concept  of  action,  such  as  intention,  norm,
identity, role, definition of the situation, institution, routine, etc., be defined
consistently” (1996: 5).  In addition, only by doing so can we ascertain adequately the
import of these conceptions. The primary referent of intentionality is to be gathered from
the improvisational responses of situated actors to the various and variable contexts in
which they are called upon to act, not from antecedently fixed ends or especially from
rigidly hierarchical orders (or arrangements) of such ends.15 Human agency is inseparable
from human improvisation and ingenuity, thus from human creativity. Action not only
unfolds in situations, but is constituted by them.16
 
IV. The Improvisational Responses of Situated Actors
21 For  Joas’s  purpose,  then,  the  most  important  point  is  to  articulate  a  nuanced
understanding of human activity in which the “creative dimension to all human action” is
shown to be a salient and, indeed, defining feature of human activity as such (4; emphasis
added). Creative activity is, accordingly, not a residual category, but a ubiquitous trait of
human agency. There is unquestionably a continuum: the ideal limit of this continuum is,
on one side, the vast range of more or less routine responses to familiar situations, while
the ideal limit is, on the other side, those paradigmatic cases or exemplary instances of
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creative intelligence. The political implications of such an undertaking are, at least, as
significant as the theoretical implications. The concluding chapter of this wide-ranging,
deep-cutting study is, after all, entitled “Creative Democracy.” The situated creativity of
human actors,  as  exhibited in the overlapping situations into which such agents  are
historically thrown and, given their historical situatedness, so often deliberately move,
defines political actors no less than artists,  scientists,  or inventors.  This is as true of
ordinary  citizens  in  their  collective  undertakings  as  it  is  of  such  notable  figures  as
Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Barack Obama in their seemingly most
singular  decisions.  As  important  as  the  political  implications  of  Joas’s  pragmatist
theorizing is, however, my main concern here is with its theoretical underpinnings.
22 We need, Joas believes, nothing less than a comprehensive model of human activity, one
in  which  the  most  important  domains  of  human  endeavor  (the  distinguishable  yet
inevitably – if only partly – overlapping contexts of such affairs as religious worship,
artistic innovation, aesthetic engagement, everyday life, and scientific investigation) are
not relegated to residual negative categories. “Intellectual history already provides us,”
Joas claims, “with the essential basis for such a comprehensive model” of human activity.
This model is none other than the one articulated and defended by Peirce, James, Mead,
and  Dewey.  The  critical  part  of  Joas’s  task  is  executed  mainly  in  Chapter  1  “(“The
Emergence of  a  Theory of  Action”)  and Chapter  2  (“Models  of  Creativity”),  although
already in the last section of the second chapter (“Intelligence and Reconstruction”) the
creative part of his project is launched. Though I have already indicated it, the creative
part of his task is important enough to recall here: In Chapter 3 (“Situation – Corporeality
– Sociality: The Fundamentals of a Theory of the Creativity of Action”),  however, the
reconstructive and, indeed, truly creative task is fully joined by Joas.
23 The extent to which the pragmatists reconstructed, rather than jettisoned, a teleological
interpretation of human action is certainly a question worthy of careful consideration. I
however  cannot  take  up  this  question  here  in  any  detailed  manner.  But  I  must
nonetheless touch upon the issue of the extent to which the pragmatists jettisoned a
teleological  interpretation  of  human  activity.17 Of  course,  everything  turns  on  the
meaning ascribed to teleology. In a vague sense, each one of the classical pragmatists
argued for what at least appears to be a form of teleology. The very vagueness and hence
indeterminacy  of  the  operative  ends  characteristically  acknowledged  by  these
pragmatists, however, might be part of what distinguishes their conception of ends from
more  traditional  versions  of  teleological  interpretation.  In  any  event,  James  in  his
Principles  famously  characterized  human  consciousness  in  emphatically  teleological
terms: “Every actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for
ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all” (1890 [1981]: 144). Or,
in “The Law of Mind,” Peirce argued, “in the case of personality this teleology is more
than a mere purposive pursuit of a predetermined end; it is a developmental teleology” (
EP 1, 331).
24 None  of  this  however  touches  the  core  of  Joas’s  critique  of  what  he  identifies  as
“teleology.” His concern is not to show that the pragmatists abandoned every notion of
end (indeed, he attends insightfully to the Deweyan notion of ends-in-view as themselves
means for remaking situations). His concern is rather to expose the fatal flaws in those
historically influential forms of teleological understanding of human activity so deeply
enshrined in both our everyday understanding and theoretical  discourses.  What  Joas
appreciates as deeply as any interpreter of Dewey is that (in Dewey’s own words) “the
A Revised Portrait of Human Agency
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, I-1/2 | 2009
8
‘goals’ of action […] are ways of defining and deepening the meaning of activity” (MW 14,
156). “Having an end or aim is,” Dewey immediately adds, “thus a characteristic of present 
activity. It is the means by which an activity becomes adapted, when otherwise it would
be blind and disorderly.” The conclusion drawn by Dewey and stressed by Joas is that “an
end-in-view is a means in present action; present action is not a means to a remote end”
(ibid.). That is, the traditional subordination of present activity to transcendent ideals or
antecedent goals belies a fatally flawed understanding of the function and status of ends,
also the significance and thickness of the present.
25 In  various  ways,  the  classical  pragmatists  contest  this  traditional  subordination.  The
Peircean  conception  of  developmental  teleology  might  be  taken  as  central  to  the
pragmatist portrait of human agency. But this form of teleology marks a decisive shift
from antecedently fixed goals and values to historically emerging ends and meanings (see
Colapietro 2004). There are, of course, inherited goals and, as such, antecedently fixed
ones; but these goals themselves have attained their status in the course of history and,
moreover,  they prove themselves worthy of  our abiding allegiance by virtue of  their
efficacy  to  assist  our  situated  creativity  in  enhancing  the  possible  meanings  in  an
overlapping series of continuous yet distinct situations.18 Such goals or ends are, hence,
not absolutely or immutably fixed, but historically evolved and evolving.
26 Joas however does not refer to the Peircean conception of developmental teleology, but
rather  focuses  on the  form in  which teleological  interpretations  of  human action is
encountered in contemporary theories, especially in the social sciences. The bias of such
interpretations is to abstract agents and their goals from the situations in which they are
called upon to respond to  shifting and often conflicting demands.  For  the purpose of
understanding the relationship between our agency and the situations in and through
which  our  agency  not  only  assumes  its  determinate  form  but  also  exercises  its
irrepressible creativity, Joas calls upon the insights of Dietrich Böhler, quoting him at
length:
By ‘situation’ we – that is, ‘we’ as human beings who act and who know about action
– understand a relationship between human beings and to objects, or between a
human  being  and  objects,  which  already  precedes  the  particular  action  under
consideration and which is therefore in each case already understood by the person
or  people  concerned  as  a  challenge  either  to  do  or  alternatively  not  to  do
something. In colloquial speech we talk about ‘getting into’ situations; they ‘befall’
us, ‘happen to’ us, and we find ourselves ‘confronted’ by them. These are ways of
expressing that a situation is something which precedes our action (or inaction) but
which also provokes action because it ‘affects’ us, ‘interests’ us, or ‘concerns’ us.
(Quoted in Joas 1996: 160)
27 Böhler uses the term “quasi-dialogical” to designate “the relationship between action and
situation”  (ibid.).  This  “quasi-dialogical”  conception  of  situation  is  taken  by  Joas  to
provide  a  non-teleological  conception  of  action.  The  intentionality  of  the  situated
responses of improvisational actors is  one thing,  the intentionality of pre-established
purposes, conceived in abstraction from the histories in which these purposes have taken
shape and are yet taking shape, is quite another thing.
28 So, it should not be surprising that Joas offers the Deweyan understanding of situation as
an alternative to the traditional emphasis on teleology, in this restricted sense. In his own
words, he is striving to offer a non-teleological interpretation of the intentionality of
action. The phenomenon to be illuminated is, in this context, the intentionality of action.
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29 Such  intentionality  seems  to  make  the  teleological  interpretation  of  human  action
inescapable. But, in Joas’s judgment, such an inference is invalid: we might account for
this  intentionality  by  means  other  than teleology.  Stated positively,  the  various  and
shifting situations in which we as improvisational actors are implicated provides a genuine
alternative  to  the  teleological  interpretation.  As  already  suggested,  what  Joas  finds
objectionable  about  teleological  interpretations of  human action is  (at  least,  in  large
measure) the assumption of antecedently fixed ends.
30 Situations are the sites in which historically authoritative ends are often discredited, at
least neutralized, and ones in which humanly novel purposes are envisioned and enacted.
The very identity of situations depends, in part, on the habits and (arguably) purposes of
the agents entangled in these situations, but the deep-cutting implications of the revised
portrait of human actors as situated improvisers are all too easy to miss. Because agents
can  so  often  fluently  and  thus  effectively  move  from one  situation  to  another,  our
understanding of situations as external scenes of human engagement – that is, as sites
through which such agents move, but not ones in and through which human beings are
constituted as creative actors – seems a faithful rendering of our trans-situational agency.
It is, indeed, impossible to miss how agents move from one situation into another (e.g.,
one  leaves  the  dining  hall,  having  concluded  a  breakfast  with  several  friends  or
acquaintances, and then briskly walks across campus to attend a meeting with colleagues,
then eventually enters a class for the purpose of meeting with the students in one’s
seminar). But is (as just noted) all too easy to miss how situations are inherent to, thus
constitutive of, agency. It is one thing for us to be teleologically oriented actors, another
to be situationally implicated agents – or so Joas argues.
31 The means-end schema of interpreting human action might have a far more restricted
scope  than  a  meaning-situation  schema.  The  enhancement  of  meaning  in  unfolding
situations, as the very possibilities for such enhancement are taken by actors in situ to
define  and,  not  infrequently, emerge in  the  course  of  engagement  to  redefine  these
situations, might turn out to be a more adequate account of human activity19 than any
possible variant of the teleological interpretation. Situations are inherently meaningful,
even if the fuller or deeper saliences are far from manifest to the actors implicated in
these  situations.  A  confusing  or baffling  situation  is  just  that  –  its  meaning  is
overwhelmingly  lost  on  us  and  our  being  implicated  in  a  situation  is  properly,
understandably,  bafflement  and  confusion.  To  repeat,  situations  are  inherently
meaningful, though the contours and trajectories of significance defining any situation
are neither fully manifest to the participants nor fully circumscribed in the present. In
turn,  meanings  are  necessarily  contextual,  even when the  forms  of  significance  and
salience have evolved to the point where they lend themselves to an ever expanding
range of trans-contextual applicability. In this context (!), what trans-contextuality means
is not that these forms ever exist apart from any situation or context, only that their
presence  in  one  context  does  not  preclude  their  presence  in  other  situations.  The
presence of meaning in this or that situation hardly rules out the prolongation of this
meaning in an indefinite number of other contexts is very far from being the case; rather
what we discern in any situation is always “the operative presence of a continuum of
meanings” (LW 1, 232; emphasis added). Moreover, this dynamic points toward a distinct
sense of relevant context in which the forms of significance need to be located, in order
to  be  in  a  position  to  move  toward  an  adequate  appreciation  of  the  dynamics  of
significance.
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32 The word situation means what it does in this discursive and polemical context because it
means what it does both in English generally and in the writings of Dewey and other
pragmatist more specifically. The immediate context of our particular discussion of this
admittedly elusive notion needs itself to be set in an inclusive linguistic context and the
narrower (but still large) philosophical context of pragmatist discourse. Of course, the
relevant contexts are matters about which reasonable disagreements might take place.
The  politics  of  meaning involves  the  possibilities  of  re-contextualization,  just  as  the
meaning of politics invites re-contextualizing, at the level of theory, the play of power
(e.g., seeing the personal domains of our everyday existence as ones in which the play of
power is discernible). But what is most important for our purpose is that context is an
elastic notion. The elasticity of this notion allows us to stretch the conception of context
to include ever wider and also fundamentally different contexts than the ones to which
our  attention,  as  situated  agents,  is  ineluctably  drawn (e.g.,  a  familial  quarrel  is  by
definition a disagreement taking place within a given set of social relationships but it is,
arguably, always taking place in a more extensive and complex network of relationships;
so, too, the conflicts among various ethnic groups, as such groups are identified by the
conflicting actors themselves, are, arguably, inseparable from other social relationships
and structures, histories and institutions).
33 The possibilities of meaning inherent in a situation are, for the advocates of the meaning-
situation schema of human action in contrast to the proponents of the means-end schema
(i.e., the teleological interpretation), far more salient than the opportunities provided by
situations for the enactment or realization of antecedently established goals. Immediate,
intrinsic, on inherent value is one thing, inherent meaning another. “Dewey’s resistance
in his theory of value to any talk of ‘inherent,’ ‘intrinsic’ or ‘immediate’ values can only
be understood against this background” – his rejection of those forms in idealism in effect
committed to celebrating ideals in abstraction from the situations in which humans are
ineluctably  implicated.  Dewey  suspects, Joas  contends  (and,  in  my judgment,  rightly
contends), “in all such language a tendency to remove values from the means-ends chain
[or continuum] of human action, to oppose them in particular to the realm of means,
thereby devaluing them” (Joas 2000: 106). To abstract values, ideals, and meanings from
this  continuum inevitably  slights  of  “the  concepts  of  human  maturity  and  personal
wisdom we employ” (106).
34 The creativity of action is nowhere more apparent than the imaginative transfiguration
of the actual scenes and dramas in which everyday actors are caught up. The goals or
ends animating and orienting actors in situ are, as Dewey stresses, means – means for
identifying and enhancing the possibilities of meaning inherent in some situation. The
means-end continuum entails not only a radical revision of our understanding of the
relationship  between  means  and  ends  but  also  an  equally  radical  revision  of  our
understanding of human action as human activity,  as an ongoing, creative process in
which the very terms of identification and description (e.g., a basic action or a rational
action) cannot be defined either in advance of the process (i.e., a priori) or apart from the
process of ongoing activity. Of course, our inherited ideas regarding human action (e.g.,
Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, or Jürgen Habermas) might certainly prove
themselves  to  be  applicable  to  some  circumscribed  field  of  human  endeavor.  They
however cannot provide adequate means for the illuminating articulation of emerging
meanings  (and,  paradoxically,  this  extends  to  nothing  less  than  such  notions  as
emergence and activity, as they are being used here).
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35 Part  of  the reason why this  is  so concerns the very nature of  time,  while part  of  it
concerns more specifically the character of human action as ongoing activity. The past
does not write the future, however much the past serves as prologue to whatever follows
it and, to some degree, flows from it. It is, as G. H. Mead suggests, much rather the case
that the present rewrites the past, making of time a ceaseless and irrepressible process of
re-signification  and  re-narration.  But,  in  addition  to  this  facet  of  temporality,  the
character of activity as situated, corporeal, and social imposes the task of beginning ever
anew to identify and describe the situation from within the contours of that situation
itself. There is never any question of absolute novelty, though there is always a question
of  genuine  emergent.  The  extent  to  which  the  present  is  identified,  described,
interpreted, and narrated in terms indifferent to its differences from the past is almost
certainly a guarantee that the historical present as a dramatic site of genuine emergence
and,  hence,  irreducible  novelty  will  be  covered  over  with  the  dominant  modes  of
traditional understanding, rather than illuminated on its own terms.  This concerns not
primarily the general structure of temporality, but mainly the specific character of our
activity. The present is the site in which the past is being re-written, thus one in which
the possibilities of the future are being re-envisioned. The efficacious character of our
situated creativity is nowhere more apparent than in the ongoing work of such revision
and re-envisionment.
 
V. Body Schema and Primary Sociality, Very Briefly
Noted
36 On this occasion,  I  will  treat far more briefly the other two fundamental  features of
human action, as these are identified by Joas. On another occasion, however, I hope to be
able to offer a fuller account of Joas’s nuanced approach to our situated creativity, also a
more detailed critique.20
37 Joas is quick to point out, “the body does not appear explicitly in most theories of action”
(Joas 1996: 167).  There is,  Joas suggests,  “an unstable equilibrium between the body’s
instrumentalization [the mastery of the body as an instrument of action] and other non-
instrumental relations with the body” (1996: 168-9). He eloquently makes this point when
he writes: “Control of the body on the stage of life is always accompanied by the periodic
relaxation of body when we go backstage” (169). The body is, for each one of us, more
than an instrument of action. Moreover, the shaping of the body to serve as such an
instrument  needs  to  be  understood  historically,  especially  when  severely  reductivist
accounts of somatic instrumentalization become the default position for understanding
our embodied agency – better,  our embodied being. As Joas notes,  “human biological
preconditions  must  obtain  in  order  for  action  to  be  possible”  (172).  Among  other
preconditions,  there is  in the case of  Homo sapiens a break with instinct  (173).  Joas
supplements the pragmatist account of our embodied agency by incorporating (!) into his
creative  appropriation  insights  derived  from  such  theorists  as  Arnold  Gehlen,  Axel
Honneth, and Helmuth Plessner.21 If undertaken in the spirit of pragmatism, the radical
reconstruction of our understanding of human activity must drive in the direction of
offering a detailed account of human activity as a concretely embodied affair and, by
implication,  an equally detailed portrait  of human agents as embodied beings.  In the
section of Chapter 3 (“Situation – Corporeality – Sociality”) entitled “The Constitution of
the Body Schema” Joas does more than anyone else thus far to offer such an account of
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human action and, by implication, such a portrait of human agency. The specific ways in
which the pragmatist tradition might be enriched and deepened by a critical engagement
with  certain  psychoanalytic  and  phenomenological  theorists  (e.g.,  Paul  Shilder  and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty) deserve especially to be highlighted.
38 The main focus of Joas’s discussion of the corporeal character of human activity is on
body schema. “The concepts of ‘body schema’ or ‘body image’ refer to the fact that the
body is subjectively present for the actor” (1996: 175). He is quick to point out the human
body is more than this; it is, indeed, “one entity among others in the world, but by virtue
of being one’s own body it  is radically different from all  other things” (ibid.).  This is
certainly true. It is however not clear – at least, to me – why the topic of corporeality is
taken more or less as the equivalent of the constitution of a bodily schema. As important
as the constitution of such a schema is for understanding the corporeal constitution of
human  action,  corporeality  in  its  bearing  on  action  extends  beyond  this  topic.  The
functional integration of the multiple facets of the human organism requisite for the
exercise of situated creativity, accordingly, involves more than the constitution of our
body schema. But any account of the integration of these factors must attend in detail to
just this constitution. Consequently, Joas’s treatment of this topic is, at the very least, an
indispensable starting point for this pressing task. It is however not likely the whole of
this task.
39 There is, in addition to our situatedness and corporeality, “a primary sociality which has
not been generated by conscious intentionality but has preceded such, in other words [,] a
structure of common action which initially consists solely of our interaction with other
bodies” (184). Such a sociality needs, as much as anything else, to be explained in terms of
the natality constitutive of our humanity (Joas 1996: 140). The primordial forms in which
human beings are with one another,  forms rooted in their  natality,  are (as  much as
anything else) what most deserves to be identified as their primordial sociality. Joas sheds
much light on the condition and indeed fate of being with others. His account of our
primary sociality is, in my judgment, even more illuminating than his treatment or body
schema. But his central insight into our situated creativity is, above all, a consequence of
his creative appropriation of central insights from classical pragmatism into the situated
character  of  human  activity.  These  insights  bear  upon  our  understanding  of
intentionality.  In  particular,  they  point  to  the  need  to  revise  our  understanding  of
intentionality  in  a  manner  that  breaks  with  the  traditional  forms  of  teleological
interpretation. The ends by which human actors, precisely as social and embodied beings,
are animated and directed are concretely specifiable only in reference to the situations to
which these actors are responding.
40 In a more balanced treatment of Joas’s creative appropriation of the pragmatist tradition
than  the  one  I  am  able  to  offer  on  this  occasion,  his  highly  nuanced  account  of
corporeality and sociality would deserve as much attention as I have given to the situated
character of human activity. Allow my exceedingly brief remarks about these two aspects
of  human agency  to  suffice  at  present.  Unquestionably,  an  adequate  account  of  our
situated creativity demands painstaking consideration of the social matrix in which our
embodied agency takes  shape,  also  the  irreducibly  corporeal  form of  even our  most
private and seemingly “ethereal” acts of imagining, reflecting, and deliberating. But, on
this occasion, the details pertaining to our sociality and corporeality are less important
than a deepened appreciation of our situated creativity, in its broad outlines.
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VI. Pressing the Question of Creativity
41 It might appear as though the very intelligibility of our activity is precluded by such a
decided emphasis on genuine emergence and irreducible novelty (cf. Hausman). But the
intelligibility  of  activity  imposes  the  task,  thus  the  activity,  of  confronting  unique
situations  in  their  elusive  uniqueness.  This  is  far  easier  said  than  done,  far  easier
announced than achieved. This might be especially true of the activity of theorizing is,
especially when the overarching goal is to provide a pragmatist interpretation of human
action, one in which the traits of action identified in the theory are integral to the form of
activity identifiable as theorizing. This is fully in accord with Joas’s own understanding:
ironically,  the  exemplary  intelligibility  of  Joas’s  approach  to  action  might  in  some
measure  count  against  its  ultimate  adequacy  as  a  truly  pragmatic  interpretation  of
creative action.
42 I  want,  however,  to  press  this  point  for  a  moment.  My reason is  that  a  pragmatist
approach to creative activity must take the form of a creative response to a problematic
situation, though a form almost certainly in critical respects unlike anything envisaged
by  the  classical  pragmatists.  The  demands  creativity  imposes  upon  our  forms  of
understanding,  above all,  upon the immediate  intelligibility  of  a  theoretical  account,
would seem to drive theorists engaged in this very undertaking to move beyond the
conceptual resources to be found in traditional approaches to human activity (Hausman).
It  seems  unlikely  that  past  thinkers  provide  contemporary  theorists  with  adequate
resources for coming to terms with the irreducibly creative character of human activity.
Doing justice to the creativity of action would seem to demand nothing less than the
creative innovations of contemporary theorists who are driven by the very nature of
their endeavor to go beyond what past authors have yet accomplished. While a creative
appropriation of various parts of our intellectual inheritance is unquestionably a central
part of this complex task (not only a central part, but also possibly a truly creative one),
such appropriation does not appear – to me at least – to be sufficient. Perhaps more than
anything else,  the extent to which we do not know what we are doing, including the
extent to which this is so even when we are immersed in the activity of theorizing (in
particular,  crafting  a  theory  designed  to  account  for  human  activity  as  a  creative
process), needs to be made a pivot around which virtually everything turns. The ways of
thematizing and, then, theorizing the varieties of human “ignorance” (the various and
often interwoven ways in which even the most conscientious agents act in – and act out
of – what might be called constitutive ignorance) invite us to look beyond the obvious yet
important situations in which agents are thrown into doubt about what they are doing in
this or that situation (that is, the kinds of situation upon which Peirce, James, Dewey, and
other  pragmatists  tend  to  tend,  almost  exclusively).  In  raising  this  set  of  concerns,
however, I am jumping ahead of the story. First, it is imperative to examine in some detail
how  Hans  Joas  in  The  Creativity  of  Action  and,  indeed,  in  other  writings  offers  an
alternative account of human activity and, by implication, a revised portrait of human
agency.  Unquestionably  obvious  and,  hence,  deceptively  simple  matters  inform  and
underwrite this account and, hence, this portrait. Above all else, these concern matters
the situated,  social,  embodied,  and creative  dimensions  of  human activity.  The most
important reason for highlighting or even mentioning these features is that they are so
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often ignored. Even when these features are formally or nominally taken into account,
they frequently are not given their full due.
43 Agency seems to many inquirers to be, by definition, an exercise of control and, in its
innermost core, the enactment of self-control. Thus, it is important to follow Joas in a
surprising  direction.  “Like  James’  theory  of  religion,  Dewey’s  theory  of  art  is,”  Joas
suggests, “aimed at experiences in which the self is not master in its own domain” (1996:
141).  It  will,  however,  be impossible for some readers of  Joas not  to hear an echo of
Sigmund  Freud’s  deliberate  blow  to  our  narcissistic  pretensions  and  agential
presumption: The ego or “I” is not a master even in its own house. As R. W. Emerson
asserted at the conclusion of “Circles,” the way of life is, in some manner and measure,
the way of abandonment (227).  “The difference between talents and character is,” he
stresses, “adroitness to keep the old and trodden round, and power and courage to make
a  new  road  to  new  and  better  goals.  Character  [in  contrast  to  talent]  makes  an
overpowering present, a cheerful, determined hour, which fortifies all the company by
making them see that much is possible and excellent that was not thought of” (227). It is,
as  much as  anything  else,  the  joyous  abandonment  of  inherited  ideals  of  possessive
mastery and, conversely, masterful possession. The capacity of the self to let go – also to
let be (cf. Heidegger) – is, from what is still today the elusive perspective of a radically
reconstructed pragmatism, one with the capacity to assist bringing into being, here and
now, what is irreducibly novel (cf. Hausman). It is very difficult for human beings to grant
to others, much less to themselves, the license to let go and to let be. There are however
those rare individuals who are capable of doing just this. “They do not close,” as James
with his characteristic eloquence, “their hand on their possessions. When they profess a
willingness that certain persons should be free they mean it not as most of us do – with a
mental  reservation,  as  that  the  freedom should  be  well  employed and other  similar
humbug – but in all sincerity, and calling for no guarantee against abuse which, when it
happens, they accept without complaint or embitterment as part of the chances of the
game. They let their bird fly with no string tied to its leg” (Perry, II: 269).
44 Those situations in which we are, at once, all too acquainted with the traditional modes of
identification (e.g., our situation is that of being in classroom, or at home, or at work) and
altogether at a loss as to how we ought to orient ourselves to just these situations – those
situations,  at  once,  all  too familiar  and truly “uncanny” – are ones about which the
inherited lexicon of American pragmatism is hardly adequate for purposes of description,
interpretation, critique,  and indeed simply identification (how, after all,  can we most
effectively identify the situation in which we are implicated?). Part of the problem here is
the presumption that we are in the position to identify the nature of the situation in
which we are implicated. A Socratic willingness to confess a rather profound form of
human ignorance – a willingness rooted as much as anything else in the courage to
acknowledge we do not know what we are doing in this situation - is an integral part of
anything  worth  of the  appellation  pragmatic  intelligence. Situated  creativity  requires
nothing less than a renewed willingness to look afresh, in the effort to see anew. This is
(at least) as much a moral and political achievement as it is an intellectual or cognitive
accomplishment.
45 Somewhat  paradoxically,  however,  the  willingness  or  resolve  to  look  afresh  at  the
situations  in  which  we  are  implicated  more  often  than  not  demands  a  deepened
understanding of the historical dimensions to such a large extent constituting these very
situations. Dalibor Veseley helps us to understand why this is so when he stresses:
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Situations are the receptacles of experience and of those events which sediment in
them a meaning not just survivals or residues but as an invitation to a sequel, the
necessity  of  a  future.  Situations  endow experience  with  durable  dimensions,  in
relation to which a whole series of other experiences will acquire meaning. […] The
richness  of  situations  depends  on  the  reverberations  of  meaning  through  the
depths of their history. (1983: 9)
46 In light of such considerations, I am inclined to propose that we need, on the one hand, to
develop  far  more  fully  than  anyone  has  yet  done  a  detailed  understanding  of  the
experiential continuum precisely as a distinctive form of historical continuity and, on the
other hand, a dramaturgical approach to the self-segmenting dynamic in any historical
continuum  (a  dynamic  nowhere  more  evident  than  in  the  way  the  continuum  of
experience inevitably divides itself  into the more or less distinguishable scenes of an
unfolding drama).  Accordingly,  highly abstract models and conceptions of  continuity,
drawn from mathematics, are likely to assist us in understanding the otherwise baffling
character of the experiential continuum. Much as the notion of rhizome has proven so
fruitful  in  one  context,  that  of  continuum might  prove,  once  again,22 fecund in  the
context of our inquiry. In addition, finely elaborated models and theories of dramatic
situations23 (such as those articulated by Kenneth Burke, 24 Victor Turner,  and Erving
Goffman) provide us with the resources to do even fuller justice to our situated creativity
than has been done by the author of The Creativity of Action or, indeed, anyone else. While
the most highly abstract models of continuity might provide, in unexpected respects,
resources for understanding the way qualitatively distinguishable scenes or episodes flow
into  one  another,  the  most  contextually  determinate  dramas  in  turn  might  offer
opportunities to explore various aspects of the experiential continuum.
47 Our being with one another, our being in time, and our being individually identifiable
continua  intersecting  with  myriad  forms  of  such  continua  are,  in  the  overlapping
situations of the unfolding drama of any human life,  are inseparably of a piece.  This
makes manifest that our primordial sociality, the distinctive form of human temporality,
and  the  temporal  constitution  of  human  individuality  (cf.  Dewey’s  “Time  and
Individuality”) intelligible only as instances of continuity. In turn, this makes necessary
the  need  to  explore  more  deeply  than  anyone  has  yet  done  questions  concerning
continuity.25 The continuum as an indefinitely divisible reality is, in connection to human
action, extremely suggestive. The very notion of action is irreducibly vague, such that
what counts as an action might itself be divided, indefinitely, into components having
themselves a claim to the status of actions. The situations in which we are implicated, the
ones in which we are thus called to respond (cf. Joas 1996: 160-1), are always in some
respects indeterminate. Such situations are inherently and irreducibly vague, in some
ways  and  to  some  degree.  So,  too,  the  multiple  possibilities  of  characterizing  any
situation or episode suggest an important respect in which a situation or episode is vague
or indeterminate. Of course, the specification or identification of action is not precluded,
since embodied and embedded purposes help practically to define relevant contexts of
responsible description (e.g., the actors are in a dangerous situation by virtue of their car
spinning out of control).
 
VII. Conclusion
48 Situation,  corporeality,  and  sociality  are,  as  much  as  anything  else,  markers,  their
principal  function  being  that  of  marking  the  most  important  sites  for  future
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investigation. The task of thinking through – inseparable from that of working through (cf.
Adorno’s illuminating exploration of  “The Meaning of  Working Through the Past” in
Critical  Models;  also  Freud)  –  a  complex  inheritance  and  the  inevitable  constraints,
enabling no less than limiting, put in place by this inescapable inheritance is ineluctably a
task of re-thinking. In some measure, it arguably must also be a task of unthinking – and
also undoing. In his journal entry for December 31, 1837 – thus, on the threshold of a new
year – H. D. Thoreau observed: “As the least drop of wine tinges the whole goblet, so the
least  particle  of  truth colors  our  whole  life.  It  is  never  isolated,  or  simply added as
treasure to our stock. When any real progress is made, we unlearn and learn anew what
we thought we knew before” (Shepard (ed.), 3).
49 In a letter to Henri Bergson, dated December 14, 1902, partly sent in response to having
received from the author a copy of  Matière  et  mémoire, James wrote:  “I  saw its  great
originality, but found your ideas so new and vast that I could not be sure that I fully
understood them, although the style, Heaven knows, was lucid enough” (Perry, II: 605).
Then James revealed to Bergson, immediately after confessing that his “health is so poor
now that work goes very slowly”:
I am going, if I live, to write a general system of metaphysics which, in many of its
fundamental ideas, agrees closely with what you have set forth, and the agreement
inspires and encourages me more than you can well imagine. It would take far too
many words to attempt any detail, but some day I hope to send you the book. How
good it is sometimes simply to break away from all old categories, deny worn-out
beliefs, and restate things ab initio, making the lines of division fall into entirely
new places! (Perry, II: 606)
50 Joas is too conscientious an intellectual historian and too responsible a social theorist
simply to break away from our inherited categories and to try to restate ab initio what
action at bottom is. He works self-consciously and painstakingly at the intersection of
diverse traditions. Even so, there is something truly creative about his achievement. The
degree and respects in which it might have even more creative, however, are worthy of
speculation. For example, the metaphor of a rhizome, such as the one put forth by Giles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, seems (to me, at least) to be especially
creative and fecund.
51 Without unduly striving to be idiosyncratic or even simply innovative, the pragmatist
theorist devoted to offering a compelling formulation of situated creativity would seem,
by the very nature of this undertaking, to be compelled not only to reconfigure or less
traditional conceptions into novel patterns but also to improvise more or less innovative
conceptualizations and creative metaphors. As Dewey notes in “The Need for a Recovery
of Philosophy,”
Our life has no background of sanctified categories upon which we may fall back;
we rely upon precedent as authority only to our own undoing – for with us there is
such a  continuously  novel  situation  that  final  reliance  upon precedence  entails
some class interest guiding us by the nose whither it will. (MW 10, 48)
52 But these include the categories offered by the pragmatists themselves for making sense
out of our experience, hence for responding imaginatively to the situations in which we
are implicated. These include, indeed, the category of experience itself (cf. Scott). It is
certainly telling that Dewey near the end of his life questioned the wisdom of trying to
redefine the term experience  rather than using culture  in its  anthropological  sense to
designate the transactional process constituting the matrix and arena of human endeavor
(LW 1, 361-4; cf. Rorty 1982, Chapter 5). Creative intelligence often demands linguistic
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innovation. The projection of novel possibilities might often require the crafting of novel
locutions.
53 This point might easily be exaggerated, but the conservative cast of academic pragmatists
suggests  that  the  risk  of  such  exaggeration  is  far  less  than  that  of  falling  back  on
categories sanctified by the elders (i.e., Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead).
54 In The Creativity of Action, Hans Joas has undertaken in an exemplary manner the task of
re-thinking  some  of  the  most  critical  parts  of  a  complex  inheritance  regarding  our
understanding of human action. Moreover, he has in the process of doing so twisted free
from  the  limiting  conceptions  and  disfiguring  images  pertaining  to  human  activity.
Finally, his nuanced account of situated creativity is itself nothing less than a creative
appropriation of a largely marginalized approach to human action. Even if Joas might
have been more creative in this or that respect, his imaginative recasting of pragmatists
insights cannot be gainsaid. It is truly a praiseworthy achievement.
55 Philosophers  ought  to  be  open to  learning  from sociologists  about  a  topic  to  which
philosophers have devoted so much attention, though often in an exceedingly myopic
manner.  So,  too,  North  Americans  ought  to  be  receptive  to  learning  from European
scholars  about  one  of  the  most  distinctive  contributions  by  such  Americans  to  the
ongoing  task  of  communal  inquiry  –  the  quite  singular  contribution  of  “American”
pragmatism. For the inaugural issue of this new journal, I take my own efforts as a North
American philosopher who has devoted his intellectual life to the creative appropriation
of classical American pragmatism – I take my own efforts as such a philosopher – to learn
from, and to respond to,  Joas’s innovative take on the pragmatic movement to be in
keeping with both the animating impulse of pragmatism and the unique mission of this
journal.  The  creative  articulation  of  our  situated  creativity, beyond  anything  yet
imagined by either the classical pragmatists or their most imaginative (and therein their
most faithful) interpreters, among whom I count Hans Joas in the first rank, is truly “a
task before us.” The task of creative democracy is the most urgent form of the task before
us,  but that of revising our self-understanding – of sketching in at least as bold and
arresting strokes as Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead portrayed the human animal as a
creative  agent  –  is  far  from  insignificant.  Indeed,  the  interminable  task  of  creative
democracy  is  of  a  piece  with  the  ever  renewed  undertaking  of  revising  our  self-
understanding.
56 Pragmatism  as  a theory  of  our  situated  creativity26 is  also  a  celebration  of  our
irrepressible spontaneity and an acknowledgment of our implicated agency. It is rooted
in the realization that, “the knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side,
whilst on the other he registers the truth he helps to create.” There “belongs to mind,”
James insists,” from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, and not a
mere looker-on” (James 1878 (1978): 21).27 The figure of such an agent must be part of any
portrait of agency worthy of carrying creatively forward the insights of the pragmatists.
But the task of creatively articulating a detailed self-understanding in which such figure
claims such centrality – the task of articulating this self-understanding – is, by its very
nature, open-ended. To some extent, then, the theory of situated creativity must – or
simply  might  –  take  the  form of  a  dramaturgical  approach  to  human  activity.  This
however points to an episode yet to be enacted, a future possibility in an ongoing drama.
28
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NOTES
1. This might even be said of pragmatism today. “The renaissance of pragmatism in American
philosophy,”  Hans Joas suggests,  “has admittedly been restricted to traditional  core areas of
philosophy. In philosophy of science and epistemology, in aesthetics and ethics, one can discern
contributions that are ‘neopragmatist’ in nature. By contrast, only rarely are links established to
political philosophy and social philosophy. And, aside from Richard Bernstein, there is an even
greater  distance  from  discussions  of  sociological  theory.  A  book  such  as  Richard  Rorty’s
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity moves with the greatest elegance between the philosophical and
literary discourses; however, a discourse in the social sciences is so conspicuously absent that
one could be forgiven thinking that it does not exist at all” (1993: 2). This however could not be
written today. It is not altogether accurate of the scene at the time it was written, though there is
almost certainly greater truth in Joas’s assessment than most academic pragmatists would be
disposed to admit.
2. In his efforts to offer a detailed classification of the sciences and, as part of this endeavor, to
identify the distinct disciplines of responsible inquiry, C. S. Peirce would appear to be a clear
exception to my claim. To some extent, this is indeed true. But, in this very endeavor, Peirce was
striving to show in detail how the different branches of investigation can fruitfully draw upon,
and appeal to, one another. In the end, the interconnections among these branches is near (if not
at) the center of Peirce’s concern.
3. While Bernstein is arguing for the adoption of such pluralism primarily within the discipline of
philosophy, I am advocating here across disciplines.
4. In this connection, The Genesis of Values is especially pertinent. Even when I do not explicitly
refer to this book, my reading of Joas’s The Creativity of Action is informed by it.
5. Martin  Heidegger,  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty,  Paul  Ricoeur  and numerous  other  thinkers,  in
Europe and the Americas as well as elsewhere, have devoted themselves to just this task.
6. “No one has linked the different dimensions of the issues entailed in action theory as Talcott
Parsons in The Structure of Social Action, which first appeared in 1937. One could term the book the
little-known classic of the little known discipline. Sociology is, of course, not unknown as such
and – needless to say – Parsons is well known within the bounds of the subject. However, in other
subjects and among the public as a whole sociology is frequently regarded merely as a source of
empirical information relating to social problems and social developments” (7). It “took until the
fifties  for  the  work  [The  Structure  of  Social  Action]  to  acquire  the  reputation  of  a  decisive
theoretical achievement.” Even then, it is doubtful the book was widely read at the time (1996: 7).
Even so, Joas takes there to be “no better way of introducing the discourse on the theory of
action than to study Parson’s arguments and the possible objections to them” (1996: 8).
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7. In a theme sounded throughout his life, John Dewey in a very late manuscript, now available as
an Appendix to volume 1 of The Later Works, asserts: “The excuse for saying obvious things is that
much  now  that  passes  for  empiricism  is  but  a  dialectical  elaboration  of  data  taken  from
physiology” (LW 1, 368). In “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” (1917), he stresses: “This
description of experience [the one he has just offered in his own name] would be but a rhapsodic
celebration  of  the  commonplace  were  it  not  in  marked  contrast  to  orthodox  philosophical
accounts. The contrast indicates that traditional accounts have not been empirical, but have been
deductions, from unnamed premises, of what experience must be. Historic empiricism has been
empirical in a technical and controversial sense. It has said, Lord, Lord, Experience, Experience;
but in practice it has served ideas forced into experience, not gathered from it” (MW 10: 10-1). In
contrast, the features of action identified by Joas, following the suggestions of Dewey and other
pragmatists, are precisely ones gathered from the practical experience of situated agents (the
experience such agents  enact  and acquire  in  and through their  participation in  a  variety  of
practices, including the theoretical practices of experimental inquiry).
8. As Dewey asserts in his Ethics and other writings, our actions simultaneously disclose who we
are at the time and define who we will be. The question of “What are we to do in this situation?”
is, for him, inseparable from the question, “Who are we to be?”
9. The expression sociological imagination is an allusion to C. Wright Mills, a figure who (while
critical  of  various facets  of  the pragmatist  movement)  can more or less  fairly  be read as  an
integral part of this intellectual tradition. Cornel West is especially instructive on this point (see,
e.g., 1989: 124-38).
10. Among other things, the task of restructuring this understanding entails not the addition of a
new category (or set of such categories), but a transformation of the very category of rational
action. In turn, this means restructuring our understanding of rationality itself. As a result of this
reconstruction, rationality comes to be seen as irreducibly situational, corporeal, and social, in a
manner and measure not acknowledged by virtually any theorists but the pragmatists.  Other
traditions of theorizing, however, have a great deal to contribute to the task of understanding
each one of these three traits of rationality (Joas 1996: 147).
11. While the model of rational action is the one principally defended in economic theory, that of
normatively structured action is the one arising in sociological theory. But, as we will see, the
predominantly economic model of rational action has a significance and influence far beyond the
borders of economics. Indeed, this model is, in certain respects, the model (the pivotal model) of
human action, around which the supplemental models turn.
12. Joas  takes  the  model  of  rational  action  as  the  main  target  of  his  critique  because  the
advocates of the other regnant model (that of normatively structured and oriented action) have
done so before him and, in doing so, have in effect grounded action theory in the presuppositions
underlying the model of rational action. This might not appear to follow, but the thrust of Joas’s
argument is that this critique does not displace the model of rational action; rather it simply
generates  residual  negative  categories  of  human  activity  (non-rational,  no  logical,  or  non-
instrumental ones). What however is needed is a category of intelligent, creative activity, as a
radical alternative to the regnant model of rational action. Accordingly, “the narrow conception
of rationality” embedded in traditional  theories of  human action will  be replaced by a more
comprehensive and, indeed, more humane understanding of human reasonableness.
13. At the outset of his study, Joas goes so far as to suggest, “[…] these tacit assumptions are
characteristic not only of action theory but of the discourse of modernity as such […]” (1996: 5).
His critique of these assumptions accordingly turns out to be nothing less than a critique of the
discourse of modernity.
14. It however turns out that this is also true of such theorists as Parsons (i.e., advocates of the
model of normatively structured and oriented action). As Joas notes, “Parsons never set out to
explain the existence of social order: rather, he want to make its existence, as a fact confirmed by
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experience, the starting point for reflection” (1996: 15). Though this is hardly explicit in his own
approach to  the  topic,  Joas  provides  us  with  some of  the  conceptions  with which we might
explain the emergence of various forms of social order. While the primary sociality of human life
is, in a sense, a given (there is no possibility of getting behind – or underneath – the actual forms
of  human togetherness,  of  our  being  with  others  (Glendinning  1998)),  the  implicit,  incipient,
inchoate  norms  constitutive  of  such  sociality  and,  then,  the  complex  evolution  of  human
associations  suggest  a  broadly  evolutionary explanation of  any social  order  in  which human
agents are implicated.
15. The habits and ultimately the character brought by agents to situations unquestionably have
a  significant  bearing  what  these  situations  are.  In  turn, these  situations  contribute  to  the
functioning of these habits but, in some respects, at least potentially to their transformation. As
Dewey notes in Art as Experience, experience in its most vital sense “is defined by those situations
and episodes that we spontaneously refer to as being ‘real experiences’; those things of which we
say  in  recalling  them,  ‘that  was  an experience.’  It  may have  been something  of  tremendous
importance – q quarrel with one who was once an intimate, a catastrophe finally averted by a
hair’s  breadth.  Or  it  may  have  been  something  that  in  comparison  was  slight  –  and  which
perhaps because of its very slightness illustrates all the better what it is to be an experience.
There is that meal in a Paris restaurant of which one says ‘that was an experience.’ It stands out
as an enduring memorial of what food may be” (LW 10, 43). Note that these are aesthetically
demarcated situations or episodes: they have their integrity and hence their identity by virtue of
a pervasive, unifying quality.
16. “Habits,” Dewey stresses, “enter into the constitution of situations; they are in and of it, not
[…] something outside of it. Here […] is a unique relation of self and things, but it is unique, not in
being  wholly  incomparable  to  all  natural  relations  among events,  but  in  the  sense  of  being
distinction, or just the relation that it is” (1911 [1977]: 105). See my “Habit, Competence, and
Purpose” (forthcoming in The Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society).
17. Of  course,  everything  turns  on  the  meaning  ascribed  to  teleology.  It  is  not  clear  to  me
whether the Peircean notion of development teleology goes far enough for Joas’s purpose. In this
connection, however, it is likely pertinent to call attention to the work of T. L. Short who has
done  more  than  anyone  else  to  show  how  the  pragmatic  approach  and  a  teleological
understanding of human activity are not only compatible but also (at least, in the case of Peirce)
intertwined with one another. See especially Short 2007 (but also 1981, 1983, and 2002).
18. In Experience and Education, Dewey stresses both the continuity of experience (or experience
as  a  continuum)  and  the  manner  in  which  interactions  tend  to  take  the  form  of  scenes  or
episodes.
19. It is perhaps helpful to draw a distinction between human action and human activity. Such a
distinction might be drawn in terms of an identifiable deed within an unfolding drama (an action
in contrast to the ongoing, open-ended activity) and the unfolding drama conceived precisely as
an open-ended affair. In such a drama, the significance and importance of deeds of actions are,
more often than not, fundamentally altered or transformed in the course of the activity itself. In
part,  this means that the later deeds and events explain (or throw light on) on earlier ones.
Unquestionably, earlier events and actions illuminate and explain, in some manner and measure,
later ones, but the reality of time is such that the present is a site in which the past is continually
being re-drafted or re-written (cf. Mead (1959: 11); also Dewey’s “Time and Individuality” (LW 
14)).
20. Early in his discussion of corporeality, Joas suggests, “action theory must defend itself against
the accusation that it intrinsically leans more heavily in favour of an activistic relationship to the
world, which is evidently culture-specific, if not gender-specific, and thus does not fulfill its claim
to universality”  (1996:  167).  Such a  presumption,  however,  allegedly “tends to obscure or  to
downgrade both the cultivation of an aesthetic sensibility that is not linked to action and the
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willingness to accept fate, that is, the unintended and unexpected events of life” (168). But it is,
at least for me, difficult to read Dewey’s “The Reflex Arc Concept” and other writings as anything
but texts in which this pragmatist emphatically asserts the irrepressible activity of the human
organism. How, then, does Dewey’s own pragmatist  account of  human activity,  with such an
emphasis, avoid such an activistic presumption? This is but one of a handful of other criticisms
or questions that I would be inclined to voice in a fuller treatment of Joas’s nuanced account of
human action.
21. It  is surprising to me that the work of Pierre Bourdieu – in particular,  his conception of
habitus – is not integrated into Joas’s discussion of either corporeality or sociality. Of course, a
theorist  cannot  treat  everyone.  But  Bourdieu’s  work  seems  especially  relevant  to  the  issues
under consideration in The Creativity of Action.
22. Of course, Peirce provides us with an exemplar of how to undertake this task. But, we need, at
the very least,  to explore the way he himself explored continuity but also to attend to more
recent developments in the investigation of this notion.
23. From the perspective being defended here, the expression dramatic situation is pleonastic, for
situations are, as envisioned by the pragmatists, inherently dramatic. This is partly a function of
their open-endedness: in the sense intended, open-endedness points (among other things) to a
state  of  affairs  in  which  the  outcome  hangs  in  the  balance,  in  which  the  meanings  to  be
intensified,  deepened,  expanded,  and  otherwise  enhanced  might  play  out  in  demeaning  or
trivializing ways. The fateful situation of human actors implicated in the shifting scenes of their
ongoing lives (and this is the overarching situation of human agency) is captured by James in
Pragmatism when he insists:  “Nothing outside of  the flux secures the issue of  it.  It  can hope
salvation [or even simply success] only from its own intrinsic promises and potencies” (125). To
grant this is “to be willing to live on a scheme of uncertified possibilities which he [the genuine
pragmatist nonetheless] trusts; willing to pay with his own person, if need be, for the idealization
of the ideals which he frames” (142-3). The sensibility defined by such willingness “condemns all
noble,  clean-cut,  fixed,  eternal,  rational,  temple-life  systems  of  philosophy”  (MT,  215;  cf.
Pragmatism, 18). Such systems “contradict the dramatic temperament of nature [the emphasis is
James’s own], as our dealings with nature and our habits of thinking have so far brought us to
conceive them” (MT, 215).
24. The relevance of Burke to the creative appropriation of the central insights in the pragmatist
tradition can-  not,  in  my judgment,  be gainsaid,  even if  it  is  very rarely  recognized.  This  is
nowhere more manifest than in reference to the topic – indeed, the task – at hand, the ongoing
endeavor to assist the creative articulation of our situa- ted creativity. His elaboration of what
situations are in themselves and how they are inevitably related to one another is just one part of
his contribution to this task, albeit an exceedingly suggestive and illuminating part.
25. In John Dewey (1967), Bernstein goes so far as to suggest, regarding Dewey’s metaphysics, we
“are  left  with  suggestions  and  hints,  not  carefully  elaborated  ideas”  (179-80).  In  Bernstein’s
judgment, the difficulties regarding Dewey’s project “can be seen in what is undoubtedly the
most  fundamental  principle  in  Dewey –  the  principle  of  continuity.  It  is  at  the  heart  of  his
naturalism” (180). “We are never given,” Bernstein alleges, “a detailed, systematic analysis of
‘continuity’” (180). It is certainly high time that the followers of Dewey or, more generally, the
proponents of pragmatism go farther than anyone has yet gone in providing just such an analysis
of continuity. Our understanding of action and much else depends upon it.
26. Pragmatism is not reducible to such a theory, but (upon any defensible construal) it must be
inclusive of nothing less than an account of human agency as situated creativity.
27. The critique of the spectator theory of knowledge might thus be construed as an implication
of an even more radical critique of the traditional portrait of human agency in which situated
creativity is made subordinate to preordained purposiveness. Knowing is at bottom the result of
doing. As Dewey puts it, “no knowing takes place without an overt taking and employing things
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on the basis of their meanings” (LW 1, 249). Situated creativity is the human face of our situated
agency. Such agency is, as I (following Joas) have stressed throughout this essay, constituted by
its involvements in serial and, to some extent, overlapping situations (e.g., the student met on
the stairs on the way to a joint seminar, followed by the seminar itself). The manifest traits of
natural existence (e.g., the hazardous character of a particular situation) are not ones projected
by humans onto nature; rather they are as much traits of nature itself as identifiable features of
our specifically human transactions with environing affairs. What Dewey in Experience and Nature
asserts about these traits is worth recalling here: “man is not contemplatively detached from
them (LW 1, 67). They involve him in his perplexities and troubles, and are the source of his joys
and achievements. The situation is not indifferent to man, because it forms him as a desiring, striving,
thinking, feeling creature. (We might add: an acting creature as well.) It is not egoism that leads man
from contemplative registration of these traits to interest in managing them, to intelligence and
purposive art. Interest, thinking, planning, striving, consummation, and frustration are a drama
enacted by these forces and conditions” (LW 1,  67; emphasis added). This goes some distance
toward  helping  us  to  understand  why  Dewey  would  assert:  “Every  case  of  consciousness  is
dramatic; drama is [in turn] an enhancement of the conditions of consciousness” (LW 1, 232). Any
situation in which we are implicated as actors, thus any one in which we are called upon to
respond in some way to what is taking place, provides incontestable evidence regarding “the
operative presence of a continuum of meanings” (LW 1, 232; emphasis added). It is for this and
other reasons why I have been urging a dramaturgical approach to the experiential continuum.
Just  as  actions  have  their  meaning  only  as  responses  in  the  situations  in  which  they  are
improvised by creative actors, so these responses in their most deep-cutting and far-reaching
significance are only identifiable, much less intelligible, only as episodes in unfolding dramas (or
at any given time a number of simultaneously occurring dramas). Unless we envision situations
as scenes in such dramas, we run the inescapable risk of fragmenting the historical continuum of
human activity into fragmentary and separable stretches of time. For the task of doing so, the
work of Kenneth Burke is likely at least as relevant as that of Victor Turner, Erving Goffman, and
Richard Schechner.
28. As Dewey asserts in “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” “the function of mind is to
project new and more complex ends – to free experience from routine and caprice” (MW 10, 45).
This  however applies  as  much to our understanding of  human experience and activity as  to
anything  else:  such  understanding  needs  itself  to  be  emancipated  and,  in  turn,  such
emancipation is at least facilitated by the projection of more untraditional and complex aims
than those defining today the terms of the activity of theorizing (i.e., the terms by which this
activity is carried out).
A Revised Portrait of Human Agency
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, I-1/2 | 2009
25
